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The ionizing radiations from X-ray machines and radio-
active materials have been recognized as injurious to
human beings since the closing years of the 19th century.
Since that time, and especially in the post-war era of
nuclear science, a great deal has been learnt about the
biological effects of radiation and radioactive materials.
These materials may be exceedingly toxic, and their
radiations can be damaging even though they themselves
remain outside the body. Radioactivity thus introduces
hazards into what would otherwise be normal operations,
and appropriate safety measures must be taken to ensure
adequate protection against these dangers.
Radiologists were the first to become aware of the
hazards of ionizing radiation, and at the Second Inter-
national Congress of Radiology in 1928 (held in Stock-
holm) it was decided to establish an International X-ray
and Radium Protection Commission. It assumed the
present name of International Commission on Radiolo-
gical Protection (ICRP) in 1950 in order to cover more
effectively the rapidly expanding field of radiation protec-
tion. Furthermore, the need for internationally accepted
units of radiation dosage had already led to the establish-
ment of an International Commission on Radiological
Units and Measurements at the First International Con-
gress of Radiology in 1925 (hela in London).
The policy adopted by the ICRP in preparing its re-
commendations is to consider the fundamental principles
upon which appropriate radiation protection measures
can be based, while leaving to the various national protec-
tion bodies the responsibility of formulating the specific
advice, codes of practice or regulations that are best
suited to the needs of their individual countries. This has
resulted in a number of reports' by the ICRP and its
various committees, covering all aspects of human exposure
and with specific recommendations regarding maximum
permissible doses and the resulting maximum permissible
concentrations of radionuclides in air and water. It is
important to realize that these values make provision
not only for protection against acute effects of radiation,
which may be detected clinically, but especially against
long-term effects which can only be determined by physical
methods of radiation monitoring, i.e. by health physics.
The ICRP recommendations have formed the basis of
various codes of practice brought out by the International
Atomic Energy Agency since 1958, covering the safe
handling of radio-isotopes, operation of reactors, waste
disposal, transport of radioactive materials and the pro-
vision of radiological protection services:
In South Africa the ICRP recommendations, together
with IAEA guides, form the basis of radiation protection
as applied by the Atomic Energy Board in terms of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1967 (replacing the previous act of
1948) and the Nuclear Installations Act of 1963, not only
in its regulatory control over all users of radioactive
material in South Africa (Government otice o. R.1822
of 4 October 1968) but also as applied to the activities
at its National Nuclear Research Centre, Pelindaba.
AEB SCIE TIFIC PROGRAMME
The research and development programme of the Atomic
Energy Board consists of 3 main themes: the develop-
ment of nuclear raw materials (mainly uranium); studies
on power production (electricity) by means of nuclear
energy; and the application of isotopes and radiation.
These are supported by the necessary fundamental research.
This programme is carried out by a total personnel of
781 (induding 150 scientists), most of them at the National
Nuclear Research Centre, Pelindaba, but with 15 working
in the field of extraction metallurgy at the National
Institute for Metallurgy, Johannesburg, and a smaller
number doing research in the life sciences at various
medical and biological institutes in Pretoria. t
The Pelindaba site' is located !lpproximately 17 miles
(27 km.) due west of Pretoria, with the Crocodile River
supplying the necessary water for cooling the research
reactor, etc., as well as providing a medium for radio-
active waste disposal.' The area of 118 acres (0-47 sq.km.)
inside the security fence-total site area of 2,913 acres
(11,5 sq.km.)-is occupied by the main scientific and
technical buildings. The main radiation hazards are to
be found in the buildings for chemistry, metallurgy, Van
de Graaff accelerator, radioactive waste treatment, engin-
eering and the reactor building. The first two are designed
to handle considerable amounts of radioactive material
for irradiation studies and isotope production; the last
two contain nuclear reactors.
SAFARI-I'·s is a high-flux research reactor, similar in
design to the Oak Ridge Research Reactor, intended for
materials testing. It is fuelled with 90% enriched uranium
cooled and moderated with light water, and became criticai
on 18 March 1966. Although its past operation has been at
a maximum of 6t MW, it is being modified for 20 MW
operation as from 1969.
The engineering building houses a subcritical as well as
a critical assembly, intended for reactor physics experi-
ments resulting from the AEB power reactor concept,
PELlNDUNA. The latter consists essentially of a zero
power reactor, which uses 2 0 0 enriched uranium as fuel
with heavy water as moderator, and became critical on 30
November 1967.
Other sources of radiation and/or radioactive contamina-
tion are a 3-MeV Van de Graalf accelerator, an 18,000-
curie cobalt-60 irradiation cell and a variety of sealed
and unsealed radioactive materials used for research.
Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Board is also responsible
for all radiation protection at the National Institute for
Metallurgy (with a total staff of 290), where most of the
radiation hazard is associated with its uranium work.
'Paper presented at the 1st South African International Radiological
Congress, Johannesburg, 29 August· 4 September \968. t Figures as at end of 196 .
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Finally, the Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant is
responsible for the disposal of all solid and liquid radio-
active waste, and the associated manipulations, especially
those for decontamination of equipment, are fraught with
radiation and, more important, contamination hazards.
In so far as nuclear research is associated with the
hazards of external and internal irradiation to personnel,
it is the function of the AEB radiation protection
organization to ensure the safety of its staff employed
at Pelindaba and elsewhere, as well as of the population
at large.
It is a fundamental principle of radiation work at Pelin-
daba that each individual iu primarily responsible for
ensuring the safety of his undertaking. This is similar to
the philosophy at certain overseas establishments," where
it has been shown that only one-half to one-third of the
operational health physics staff is required as compared
with the provision of a comprehensive health physics ser-
vice.
The head of each division is responsible for having the
established policy carried out by his personnel. This is
done in consultation with the Building Head, who has to
ensure the safety of his building.
A Safety Committee, consisting of specialists in all the
fields associated with safety, is responsible for the general
policy and, more specifically, for reviewing all proposed
experiments which might present a hazard, as well as new
facilities before they are commissioned.
The practical, including financial, aspects of the safety
policy are the responsibility of a Safety Executive which
reports to the Director Genera\' who is ultimately respons-
ible to the Board for all aspects of safety.
However, because of the specialized nature and extent
of radiation hazards, which are not normally encountered
in any academic curriculum, it is necessary to have
specialists in radiation protection and control available.
These persons are based in the Isotopes and Radiation
Division and act as specialist advisers, as well as providing
the necessary personnel for daily monitoring of each
active area. They look after the compulsory training of
all radiation workers and are also responsible for con-
ventional safety.
A Building Health Physicist with an appropriate num-
ber of assistants (e.g. a total of 8 for SAFARJ-I) is ap-
pointed to each building where a radiation hazard may
arise, to co-ordinate radiation protection and to ensure pro-
tection of third parties. Basically he only acts in an advisory
capacity, and any problems which may arise are solved
through the normal channels; the only exception is when
he is wholeheartedly convinced that serious damage will
be done to personnel or AEB property. In such an instance
he has the jurisdiction to act immediately. The health
physicist's specific responsibilities include ensuring that:
(a) all radiation workers are medically fit (medical
examinations are carried out by the medical staff
on a confidential basis and only the positive or
negative findings are submitted);
(b) each radiation worker has sufficient knowledge and
experience to carry out his task safely, as well as
HEALTH o SAFETY ORGA IZATtO,
being aware of the safety measures concerned;
(c) the prescribed rules and regulations are complied
with; and
(d) the necessary dosimeters, monitors, protective
clothing, etc., are available and in good working
order.
Medical services are provided by the Life Sciences
Division, including pre-employment and periodic medical
examinations, as well as treatn:ent in case of accidents, in
close collaboration with the H. F. Verwoerd Hospital,
Pretoria. This division also provides the necessary medical
backing for the Isotopes and Radiation Division in the
accumulation of excreta for bio-assay by the latter, as
well as for whole-body counting to determine the body
burden of internally accumulated radionuclides in each
radiation worker.
The Chemical Operations Division is responsible for all
decontamination and radioactive waste disposal services:
although the determination of released airborne activity
has been delegated to the Isotopes and Radiation Division;
health physics cover is provided to the former division
in the same way as other operations at Pelindaba.
Finally, an emergency organization has been established,
including a link-up with the police headquarters in Pre-
toria, to provide for the possibility of an incident causing
the release of radioactivity to the Pelindaba site or-
though extremely unlikely-olf-site release.
RADIATlO PROTECTlO
The Isotopes and Radiation Division (which is also re-
sponsible for non-bioJogical applications of isotopes and
radiation as well as the regulatory control of all users of
radioactive material in South Africa) is divided into 3
subdivisions-(i) Radiation Control, (ii) Health Physics
and Safety, and (iii) Radioactivity-each of which has
other functions as well as those associated with radiation
protection. The first is responsible for personnel dosimetry,
including external exposure and internal contamination-
the last-mentioned in collaboration with the Life Sciences
Division; the second is responsible for the monitoring of
working areas, including the provision of Building Health
Physicists; the third is responsible for the determination
of radioactivity in the environment of Pelindaba as well as
using the radiometric techniques for bio-assay as required
by the first. A total manpower equivalent of 35 (of which
6 are scientists) has been allocated to all aspects of ra-
diation protection, about J5% of their time being devoted
to associated research.
Personnel Monitoring
The monitoring of personnel for exposure to external
radiation, as well as internal radioactive contamination, is
the ultimate check on the long-term radiation safety of
each individual worker.. In the case of gross over-exposure,
personnel monitoring is done to assist in deciding the
initial treatment of the exposed personnel. Over-exposure,
like any other disability sulfered by man, is treated
according to the severity of the clinical symptoms, but,
since there is a time-lag between exposure and the
appearance of symptoms, the dose estimates serve to select
the potentially more serious cases.
s
All personnel who may be exposed to more than one-
tenth of the maximum permissible 5 rem per annum (ICRP
Publication 2)' are classified as radiation workers and
receive routine medical examinations, including the
measurement of internal contamination, and are issued
with personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing.
etc. All radiation workers undergo a pre-employment
medical examination as well as comprehensive annual
examinations, including slit-lamp examination of the
eyes and a recording of the fields of vision. full blood
counts and urine examination. and also chest X-rays and
ECG studies in many cases.
Internal contamination is determined directly by means
of the AEB whole-body counter'· on an annual ba is, but
is limited to gamma-emitters and energetic beta-emitters
which give ris: to d~t~ctable bremssfrahlll1//l. 1 he deter-
mination of alpha or soft beta contamination (e.g. uranium,
tritium) is done by the bio-assay of urine, faeces, etc.; all
radiation workers exposed to appreciable amounts of
uranium have urine analyses performed on a monthly
basis by the Chamber of Mines Uranium Safety Labora-
tory.
External exposure is recorded permanently by means
of AERE/RPS film badges," as supplied by the Radiation
Protection Service of the South African Bureau of Stan-
dards (SABS), as well as by quartz-fibre pocket dosi-
meters which give an immediate indication; excellent
correlation has been obtained between these two methods
for short-term exposure." Radiation workers who may be
exposed to more than three-tenths of the maximum per-
missible dose wear their film badges for a 4-week period
(total of 107 at Pelindaba plus 69 at the ational Institute
for Metallurgy), while the others do not change their
badges for 13 weeks (total of 179 at Pelindaba plus 71 at
the ational Institute for Metallurgy), except in the case
of a suspected over-exposure; a PTW-designed ring is
used for determining the dose to fingers and hands.
V/here fast neutrons present a hazard, an additional
neutron emulsion badge" (also SABS) is required to be
worn on a 2-weekly basis (total of 91 at Pelindaba).
Where neutron over-exposure due to a nuclear excursion
is possible, a so-called criticality dosimeter H is worn in
which threshold detectors serve to give an indication of
the neutron spectrum, which is essential for determining
the biological dose equivalent as well as an estimate of
the exposure. The whole-body counter can also be used to
determine the sodium-24 formed by interaction with the
normal body sodium. Furthermore, the activation of
sulphur in hair. and of elements like nickel, gold, copper
and iridium in personal items such as jewellery, pens,
coins, belt buckles, dental fillings, etc. can be used to
evaluate the neutron over-exposure. Excessive gamma ex-
posures (> JOR) can be determined by stripping the more
ensitive emulsion from one side of the double emulsion
film."
Table I pre ents a ynopsis of the personnel monitoring
methods used by the Atomic Energy Board.
AEB personnel monitoring results for 1967 are presented
in the annual report" in the form of 3 tables setting out
beta-gamma exposures, neutron exposures and uranium
urine analyses for the various buildings. Thus far the
exposures have been very low, with only 14'1 o~ of all the
monitored personnel howing any detectable beta-gamma
exposure of which only 4'7°0 (i.e. 0.7 0 0 of the total, repre-
senting 2 individuals) recorded an exposure in excess of I
rem, i.e. one-fifth of the permissible annual exposure.
Complete exposure records for each individual radiation
worker are maintained so that the 'radiation status' of a
person is always available; such records may be required
as evidence in claims for damages.
Area Monirorin!j
All areas where there is a possibility of personnel
exposure to radiation are clearly labelled. using a zoning
system that has been adapted from that employed at Har-
welL' A distinction is made between external radiation
hazards and surface or airborne contamination hazards.
Either type of hazard may be present in the ab ence of
the other (e.g. there is no contamination hazard as ociated
with the operation of an X-ray machine), and so each zone
is given a double classification. Zones are colour-coded
with the relative hazard increasing from zero for white
through blue and red to purple, which denotes a very
serious hazard.
Details of these zone classifications are given in Table
1I and III for radiation and contamination hazards. re-
spectively. Specific procedures are laid down for each
colour zone and it is the responsibility of each individual
radiation worker to ensure that these are rigidly followed.
It is the Building Health Physicist's job to have zone
specified according to the probable hazard and according
to the result of the routine radiation and contamination
surveys which constitute an important part of his work.
He ensures that the required barriers. protective clothing
bins, signs and monitor are placed in position.
By means of appropriate lectures and demonstration
by the health physics staff. through the training appropriate
to his own work, and by on-the-job experience, each
radiation worker should be familiar with the procedure
applicable to the different zone. He consult the health
physics staff whenever it is necessary for him to undertake
a job in a hazardous area or where special precautions
have to be taken.
Basically, the approach is to keep areas of high radiation
and/or contamination hazard as small as possible, to
restrict the access of personnel to such zone to the absolute
minimum, to limit their time in a hazardous radiation
zone as much as is practicable and, where contamination
is concerned, to en ure that it is confined to the appro-
priate zone. This is achieved by enforcing a rigid protective
clothing routine at barriers to 'red' and 'purple' con-
tamination zone and by providing monitor with which
the personnel can check hands, shoes and clothing for
contamination at these points; a total of 79 stationary and
107 portable monitor (approx. value R200.000) are
available.
In general. mean radiation, urface contamination and
airborne activity levels have been well within perm;ssible
limits. Airborne concentrations of radioactive isotope
above ICRP levels have occurred from time to time, but
adoption of the appropriate protective measures ha
en ured that no radiation worker ha inhaled or ingested
anywhere close to the maximum permissible body burden

























1183VIR G-ENEESKU'DES.A. TYDSKRIF27 September 1969
1184 S.A. MEDICAL JOURNAL 27 September 1969
TABLE J. SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL MO /TOR] G METHODS USED AT PELJNDABA
Whole body




p-y radiation Whole body
Apparent y-dose under Cd
- Apparent y-dose under Sn
3·4
Changed every 2 weeks to minimize
latent image fading. ot very
satisfactory, does not work below
500 keY
The average man contains about
100 G ofsodium-23, which has a
fairly large cross-section for a
(n, y) reaction giving 24Na which
is readily detectable
o neutron dosimeter with a re-
sponse proportional to the ab-
sorbed dose exists, and since the
neutron dose ili very energy de-
pendent, it is necessary to obtain
some idea of neutron energy
spectrum at the time of the inci-
dent. The relative activities of the
various threshold detectors give
an approximate spectrum
By sampling excreta, nose-wipes,
biopsy samples, etc., it is usually
possible to form a reasonable
idea of the exposure, provided the
source of alphas is known
Tritium in the form HTO equili-
brates rapidly with body water
and hence urine, plasma activities
are very representative of body
burden
Where possible, samples are taken
at beginning of work week, so
that no uranium was handled for
at least 2 days before sampling.
This ignores initial rapid excre-
tion of highly soluble U and
allows an estimate to be made of
actual body burden
Remarks
Potentially exposed to doses~ 100
mR/month
Exposure rate ~ 30 mR/momh
highly unlikely
As required where hands come close
to sources, e.g. in source prepara-
tion
If potentially exposed to levels ~
20mR/day
As required for rescue, decontami-
nation or other work under
planned exposure
Whole-body counter is regarded as
part of medical examination and
serves to establish baseline of
nor:mal body radioactivity against








































































































































































































TABLE 1/1. CONTAMI ATION ZONE CLASSIFICATIONS
Contamination
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o access without special
authorization by a health
physicist, who will prescribe
appropriate protective clo-





None Laboratory coat or overalls
for radiation workers. Visi-
tors must wear overshoes
Hazard> MPL
Some but nOI great. 0 visitors allowed. Special
Below MPL provision may be required,
such as overshoes, gloves,
respirators, etc.
radiation. He was not wearing a film ring at the time of
the exposure but the dose to his hands was c timated
to be in the range 20 - 40 rem, i.e. more than the 20 rem
that may be accumulated in any 13-week period, but prob-
ably not more than twice that amount. In consequence.
it was recommended that this person be removed from
duties involving exposure to radiation for the next 13-
week period.
However, an incident which resulted in more erious
radiation and contamination hazards of a long-term nature
took place when the plutonium-beryllium start-up source
failed during the commissioning of SAFARI-l by the sub-
contractors in April 1966. An e timated 10% of the 160
G of irradiated plutonium, with its fission products, e caped
into the various reactor systems, with the result that serimls
radiation and contamination hazards arose. otwithstand-
ing this, no personnel suffered injury, ingested radioactive
material or received radiation exposures in excess of ICRP
maximum permissible limits. Furthermore. no danger to
the general public arose in any way as a consequence of
the incident."
District Monitoring
During the normal operation of most nuclear research
centres, especially where reactors are in operation, radio-
active waste is produced. some of which is subsequently
released to the environment. Relea'se to the environment
are normally controlled so a to comply with the ICRP
recommendations for radioactivity in drinking water and
air, but there is still the po sibility of secondary concen-
tration processe which may lead to unacceptable concen-
trations in the food chain. A survey is therefore performed
before commencement of operations, to determine the
background radioactivity due to natural sources as well a
nuclear bomb fall-out. Subsequently, any increase due to
operational release of activity or a nuclear incident may be
positively identified and evaluated; it is, however, import-
ant to realize that the occurrence of an accidental release
will be indicated by a prompt monitor, and only the extent
> 10-'
Procedures
Film badges for radiation workers.
quartz-fibre dosimeters for visi-
tors
o restrictions, no dosimeters
Film badges and quartz fibre dosi-
meters for radiation workers.
Special provision, such as time
limitation or additional shield-
ing, must be made for control of
external radiation exposure. 0
visitors allowed
No access without special authori-
zation; then only after special
precautions have been taken
and health physicists have given
special instructions
Same as above when source of ra-
diation is on (e.g., accelerator or
X-ray machine) or source expo-
sed (irradiation unit). Otherwise,
white zone
Purple
Surface a. Surface P
Zone p.Ci/sq.cm. p.Ci/sq.cl1l.
White <1·3 x 10- 7 <4 x IO- s
(= 30 d.p.m. per (= 1,000 d.p.m.
lOO cu.cm.) per lOO sq.cm.)
Blue < 10-' <- 10-'









Purple Very high, say
~25
Intermittent As above when
source on
have occurred in the Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant,
as a result of the decontamination of components from
the reactor building. However, the decontamination centre
has been designed for work of this nature. and close
supervision by the health physics staff has enabled the
work to be carried out in a safe manner.
Only one incident involving an over-exposure to ra-
diation has occurred during the 5 years of operations at
Pelindaba. This resulted from the malfunction of a tool
for automatically removing hydraulic rabbit capsules
from their outer sleeves after irradiation in the reactor.
The per on concerned manually dislodged the capsule
from its outer' sleeve and, in so doing, sustained a whole-
body dose of 3·08 rem of f3-radiation and 0·28 rem of y-
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of its ub equent di persion by the environmental urvey.
At Pelindaba a pre-operational survey was tarted 18
months before the reactor became critical and the total
alpha and total beta background activities were established
in samples of soil, 'vegetation, water, sediment, plankton,
fish and milk. Through a statistical (variance) analysis,
limits were calculated which, if exceeded in future samples,
would indicate a statistically ignificant increase in the
environmental activity. nece sitating analyses for pecific
nuclides.'·'8
A comprehen ive programme of collection and measure-
ment of fall-out radioactivity has been established not only
at Pelindaba but at a number of centres over the country.
From these the effect of the fall-out on the environmental
activity was established."'1S
At Pelindaba regular releases of radioactive waste are
made to the Crocodile River, and are controlled by a
formula' ba ed on the ICRP recommendations, viz:
200 x '''Ra-activity + 20 x "Sr-activity + 2·86
x a-activity .a-activity';;; 4·54 curie/l3 weeks,
on condition that a rate of 20·8 mCi/h (i.e. 10 x average)
should not be exceeded. This formula ensures that even
at the minimum average daily flow of the river, the ICRP
values for drinking water for the general public will not
be exceeded.
Regular samples of water, sediment, water-plants, plank-
ton and fish are taken from the Crocodile River and the
Hartbeespoort Dam for analysis and compared with the
control levels. (All results are reported semi-annually to the
Department of Water Affairs which is the controlling body
for effluent released into public streams.) Increases and
variations found so far could all be attributed to fall-out
from nuclear bomb test or variations in natural activity;
no increases due to operations at Pelindaba were found.
Releases to the atmosphere take place continuously and
are more difficult to control than liquid discharges. For-
tunately, atmospheric releases are normally restricted to
the gaseous activity "Ar (predominantly from SAFARI-I),
which i produced by neutron activation of the stable argon
in air; particulate activity which might be present is re-
moved through highly efficient filters. The activity is
released to the atmosphere through a 70-metre stack.
which provides an average atmospheric dilution of about
10'. Theoretically. the variation of maximum ground-level
concentration under extreme atmospheric conditions will
be within a factor of 5. More important is the fact that
the distance from the stack to the point of maximum con-
centration varies from 300 metre under very unstable
condition to 10 km. for very stable conditions. (The AEB
ite represents an exclusion area with a radius of 1·5 km.)
However, the normal releases are uch that even under
the worst dilution conditions the atmospheric concentra-
tions are negligi ble. Furthermore. because the released
activity is gaseous, it does not produce a cumulative de-
position hazard.
Although a nuclear reactor cannot explode like an
atom bomb. an uncontrolled release of fission products
to the atmosphere may take place a a result of a nuclear
incident. Consequently it is a prerequisite, before the
operation of any major nuclear facility i approved by the
Safety Committee. that the effect of a o-called maximum
credible accident be analysed. This involves the calculation
of the dispersion of activity to the surroundings, which
ha to be based on actual micrometeorological observations.
These consist of continuous recording of wind direction
and speed at 5 m. above ground level as well as the top
of the stack, and also of the temperature profile along the
length of the stack. In addition, actual dilution factors
are at present being determined experimentally. This ad-
vance information will enable prompt decisions to be made
at the emergency control centre in case of a large relea e
of activity.
CO CL 510
The AEB organization for radiation protection and con-
trol has been established, implemented and proved-also
for emergency conditions as evidenced during the pluto-
nium incident.
In addition to the scientific work already mentioned,
health physics research is also well-advanced in fields such
as whole-body counting, the correlation of lung cancer in
uranium miners with radon exposure, radioactive fall-out
from nuclear bomb tests, radiation shielding, the dispersion
of airborne effluent and aerosol physics. The last-mentioned
studies have included the very important aspect of testing
the efficiency of the filters in the SAFARI-I ventilation
system.
S MMARY
The organization and results of radiation protection and
control at the National Nuclear Research Centre, Pelindaba,
which i the research institute of the South African Atomic
Energy Board, are described. The site has been occupied
since July 1963, and had a total staff of 781 (including 150
scientists) by the end of 1968. The main radiation facilities
are the materials-testing research reactor SAFARI-I (ORR-type.
criticality achieved 18 March 1965, at present being converted
from 6t to 20 MW), the critical assembly PEU DU A-ZERO,
an exponential assembly, a 3-MeV Van de Graaff accelerator
and an 18,OOO-curie cobalt-60 irradiation facil.ity, as well as
the Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant. .
Personnel dosimetry is based on regular medical examina-
tions, radiation exposure monitoring by fiImbadge and quartz-
fibre dosimeter, and the determination of internal contamina-
tIon by means of whole-body counting and radiochemical
methods of bio-assay.
Area monitoring is accomplished by the appointment of the
required health physicists for the various buildings, and pro-
vision of suitable monitoring equipment. Radiation and con-
tamination incidents are analysed and the relationship between
radiation protection staff and scientific/technical personnel is
discussed.
Environmental surveys were carried out around PeLindaba
before operations began. The present programme is aimed at
detecting any hazardous build-up of radioactivity which may
occur due to normal releases of radioactive effluent to the
atmosphere and the Crocodile River, as well as during emer-
gency situations.
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UPPER FEMORAL OSTEOTOMY IN THE TREATME T OF PARALYTIC
SUBLUXATION OF THE lOP DUE TO POUOMYELITIS*
B. S. JONES, Princess Alice Onhopaedic Hospilal, Cape Town
Blundell Jones' incriminated coxa valga as the main
cause of paralytic hip luxation, occasioned by weak hip
abductors opposed to strong adductors and developing over
several years in those contracting poliomyelitis under the
age of 2 years. Somerville' suggested that the determining
factor was what he termed the 'effective valgus', whether
resulting from coxa valga due to muscle imbalance, from
an adduction contracture as in the cases reported by
Watson Jones3 or from pelvic obliquity, and maintained
that the nearer the angle between the femoral neck and
the horizontal plane of the pelvis approaches 90 0 , the
more unstable the hip becomes.
Despite this better understanding of the mechanism of
luxation, its management still presents problems. Blundell
Jones, who originally' recommended varus osteotomy to
restore a femoral neck-shaft angle of about 120 0 , later'
advised an angle of 105 0 in those under 5 years of age
in view of some recurrences of valgus and luxation in
this group. While suspecting that the recurrent valgus was
due to persistent muscle imbalance and recognizing the
value of iliopsoas transfer in preventing redislocation in
myelomeningocele, he felt that this muscle was rarely
sufficiently spared to justify its transfer in poliomyelitis.
Blundell Jones' reported 6 redislocations following 24
varus osteotomies, which compares favourably with the
11 failures in 13 osteotomies reported by Parsons and
Seddon: Furthermore, of 9 acetabuloplasties and 2 Salter
pelvic osteotomies in their series, 6 of the 8 adequately
followed up have already failed. They conclude that cor-
rection of the bony deformity must be supplemented by
rectification of the muscle imbalance that produced it.
Mustard' reports favourably on the effect of iliopsoas
transfer on hip stability, but gives no specific results in
luxation due to poliomyelitis.
The present paper analyses the results of upper femoral
osteotomy in a small series of cases of paralytic sub-
luxation of the hip, with a view to assessing its value and
elucidating the causes of recurrence.
MATERIAL
All cases of osteotomy of the hip p-rform d al this
hospital between 1 January 1958 and 1 January 1966
'Date received: 3 February 1969.
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for the relief of paralytic luxation of the hip due, with one
exception, to poliomyelitis have been reviewed. Two
patients lost to follow-up and one patient who died early
from a lung abscess have been excluded. Dislocations due
to myelomeningocele or cerebral palsy have not been
included here, as it is felt that in these conditions acces ory
factors are active. The details of. the 12 cases reviewed
are shown in Table I. Nine patients were Coloured, 2
were White and there was I Bantu. Six were male and 6
female. Poliomyelitis was causative in 11 cases and an intra-
spinal, lipomatous, mesodermal defect in one; and. of the
poliomyelitis cases. 2 incurred their disease in Ihe first
year of life, 2 between I and 2 years, 3 at 2 years and 4
at 3 years of age. All cases were more or less freely
ambulant with or without supportive appliances from an
early stage.
Causative Factors
In only two cases, cases 4 and 7, did pelvic obliquily
appear to be a major causative factor and in one further
case, case 11, a contributory factor. In all case there
was an imbalance of varying degree between weak hip
abductors and stronger adductors and flexors, and in
most between stronger external than internal rotators. As
a crude estimate of hip valgus and/or anteversion, radio-
graphs were taken in the upine position with leg flexed
over the end of the table and in various degrees of hip
rotation. The film that showed the neck-shaft angle at
its most acute position was taken as the approximate
measure of this angle, and the degree of internal rotation
at which this film was taken a an index of the ante-
version.
By this rough standard, the neck-shaft angle fell be-
tween 130 0 and 140 0 in 10 cases, was 150' in one and
unrecorded in one. Shands and Steele' estimated the
average neck-shaft angle as 145 0 at the age of one and
138 0 at 2 year, decreasing to 132 0 at 16 years, so that
the majority of the cases in thi series fall within normal
limits, whereas Blundell Jones reported significant coxa
valga as the outstanding factor in his serie . Perhaps the
di crepancy can be explained by the fact that all the
ca es in this series were freely ambulant from an early
stage, whereas some of his patients were unable to walk.
